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Abstract: 
There is a substantial body of scholarship on the role of discourses in producing the 
neoliberal politics of austerity, but this has tended to leave untouched the question of 
how the household might be implicated in such discourses. This article argues that the 
introduction of various austerity programmes in the aftermath of the financial 
upheavals of 2008-9 has produced a new normalisation of the British household, and 
that much of this centres on particular narratives surrounding the concept of waste. 
Offering a genealogy of waste, we contend that the language and very politics of 
austerity are in part made possible through longstanding, historic discourses of 
household waste, and yet the concept of waste is in itself being reconfigured and 
reimagined in and through the language of austerity. We argue that such discourses 
serve to naturalise the systemic inequalities and structural violences of neoliberal 
capitalism, for they render the poor both individually culpable for their own poverty 
and collectively culpable for Britain’s economic and social crisis.  
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Introduction 
In 2011 a new series appeared on British television screens claiming to be ‘the money show 
for these financially straightened times’ (Endemol 2015). Called Superscrimpers: Waste Not, 
Want Not by its makers, the global media giant Endemol, the show was, as its website 
makes very clear, on a mission to improve and discipline us: 
Hosted by Queen of the Penny Pinchers, Mrs Moneypenny, the show 
delves into the purses of some serious superspenders, filming their 
wasting ways and gathering evidence before bringing them face to face 
with their excess spending (Endemol 2015). 
Directly addressing the UK’s ‘squeezed middle,’ Superscrimpers was produced as a response 
to the lingering aftermath of the financial crisis of 2008-9. Despite low or zero inflation, the 
withdrawal of state subsidised services (e.g. childcare) and some aspects of the welfare state 
(e.g. tax credits) placed considerable additional financial pressures on ‘average’ households 
with static incomes. To help its target audience make ends meet in the face of this economic 
crisis, the show presented advice on both how to spend less and how to save more. Viewers 
of both the series and its associated website could gain access to money management advice 
(credit cards, bank accounts, etc.) and tips on making the most of purchases, doing it 
yourself and/or simply doing without.   
Ostensibly an exercise in thrifty home economics, Superscrimpers also carried an explicitly 
moral agenda. Its main targets, as the quote above suggests, were ‘superspenders’ – 
shorthand for households spending beyond their means. As this implies, British middle class 
households were not passive victims of the financial crisis but – because of their ‘wasteful 
ways’ and ‘excess spending’ – were complicit in any hardships they were encountering. The 
somewhat cartoonish figure of ‘Mrs Moneypenny’ invoked both a James Bond-like 
Britishness and, much more directly, an image that Margaret Thatcher presented to the 
British people in the late 1970s of a conservative housewife running the country like a 
tightly-budgeted, conventional ‘household.’ If only we were all more careful with our money 
– by following the Superscrimpers tips, buying its spin-off books and subscribing to its 
website – then all would be well.   
One of the first of such shows, Superscrimpers has formed part of a wider cultural trend that 
scrutinises, and more or less explicitly condemns, the ‘lifestyles’ of middle and low-income 
families – lifestyle implying an active choice. While Superscrimpers went for the lower 
middle classes, so-called ‘poverty-porn’ shows such as Saints and Scroungers, Secret 
Millionaire or Benefit Street have purported in various ways to represent even the poorest 
communities. Whatever their target, such shows allow ‘experts’ to adjudicate on, and 
prescribe solutions for, the faults of those in financial difficulties. Almost invariably, those 
solutions emphasize the need for restraint, self-improvement and self-help (Mooney and 
Hancock, 2010). According to such shows, then, the central problem to be faced is neither 
poverty nor financial difficulty per se. Rather, it is a problem of waste and, more precisely, 
the wastefulness of households. Waste is located in the household, and so it is households 
that require discipline.  
In this article we contend that austerity programmes introduced in the aftermath of the 
financial upheavals of 2008-9 have produced a new normalisation of the British household 
that often centres on particular narratives of waste. The UK’s austerity regime (of which the 
media is an adjunct part) ascribes negative notions of waste and wastefulness to households 
in ways that intensify what counts as ‘normal’ for some groups whilst accepting very 
different versions of normal for others. As a consequence, poor households are presented 
not only as individually wasteful, but as the key contemporary site of waste.  
Importantly, part of how such discourses function is to present themselves as natural facts 
rather than as contingent products of historical legacies. It is, then, critical to historicise 
discourses – to pursue a genealogy or ‘history of the present,’ as Michel Foucault so 
famously put it (Foucault 1979, 31). We therefore situate our discussion of contemporary 
discourses within a broader genealogy of the evolving meanings of household waste in 
order to illuminate how these have long been inextricably connected to the evolution and 
reproduction of the ‘social body’ of the British state (Poovey 1995). Our argument is that 
concepts of household waste have been deployed in both historical and contemporary 
struggles to describe, explain and locate what counts as ‘belonging to’ and, by contrast, 
‘excluded from’ (or ‘not tolerated by’) emergent state/social forms. Although it has been 
argued elsewhere that the story of modernity might itself be understood as a story of the 
‘production of “human waste,” or more correctly wasted humans (the “excessive” and 
“redundant”)’ (Bauman 2013, 4), the contribution we make here is to show how the 
production of waste has long been intertwined with that of the household.  It is not only 
that waste is constructed in part through the household but that the household itself is 
constituted through the normative social and economic boundaries of ‘wastes’. By taking 
the household as our point of departure, we open up new space for critical enquiry into 
austerity as a mode of governance that is built upon constructions of people and 
populations as making, and being, waste.  
Our article proceeds as follows. First, we establish the need to politicise discourses of 
household waste and, in the light of this, offer a discussion of our overarching methodology, 
genealogy. Second, we turn to the past in order to politicise the present, and present two 
historical illustrations of how discourses of household waste have long played a role in 
constructing the boundaries of national sovereignty. We suggest that – although the concept 
has evolved and been transformed – older meanings have not been supplanted but remain 
as part of an expanding lexicon of household wastes. Third, we turn our attentions to the 
present in order to map some of the ways that household waste is being used – explicitly 
and implicitly – in contemporary British politics and, especially, as an integral part of the 
austerity agenda as articulated and implemented by successive Conservative governments 
under David Cameron. Drawing on the discourse analysis of Cameron’s speeches from 
throughout his time as Prime Minster, we interrogate how the household appears as a key 
locus of ‘waste’ in ways that enable poor households to be marked out as deviant (e.g. 
‘troubled families’) and which therefore work to naturalise structural inequality and poverty 
as ‘normal.’  
 
Politicising discourses of household waste  
In this article we ask: how have discourses of household waste come to be mobilised in 
neoliberal austerity politics? This question is especially significant given the routine erasure 
of the household in political economy – a body of scholarship that often treats capitalism as 
if it has ‘no home’ (Eisenstein cited in True and Hozic 2016, 4). In particular, although there is 
a substantial literature on the role of discourses in (re)producing the neoliberal politics of 
crisis and austerity (see for instance Hay and Smith 2013; Fairclough 2013; Blyth 2013; 
Schmidt 2016), this has tended to leave untouched the question of how the household might 
be implicated in such discourses. This is not to say that the household is overlooked per se, 
for scholars have explored both the housing market as a cause of crisis and the 
consequences of austerity on households (see for instance Hay 2011; Browne 2012; Murphy 
and Scott 2014; O’Hara 2015). Yet the household as a discursive site in and of itself does not 
tend to feature in discussions of crisis and austerity. For example, Colin Hay suggests that 
the austerity imperative has been discursively constructed through the language of debt and 
that this both obscures and sustains the very Anglo-liberal growth model that led to crisis in 
the first place (Hay 2013). Similarly, Mark Blyth argues that austerity is ‘a dangerous idea’ 
that rests upon the mistaken notion that economic crisis is a ‘sovereign debt crisis generated 
by excessive spending’ (Blyth 2013, 5). But what has received scant attention is how the 
politics of austerity are being articulated not only through references to the public 
indebtedness of prior governments but also through a series of metaphors surrounding the 
‘irresponsible’ private household (Jensen 2012). This omission matters a great deal for, as 
feminists have long argued, political economy is built upon the household: ‘Households are at 
the root of the language of modern economics … We might even say that all traditions of 
political thought that assume rulership or sovereignty as the essence of government and 
politics find their origins in practices of household rule’ (Owens 1015, 3).  
In asking how neoliberal austerity is bound up with discourses of household waste, we 
should be clear from the outset that we approach this intellectual question as an inherently 
and inescapably political one. We do so not only because it addresses one of the major 
concerns of present-day British politics – the austerity agenda – but more fundamentally 
because we are committed to a post-positivist rather than neo-positivist agenda in which all 
social questions are understood to be necessarily political (for a discussion see Sjoberg 
2015). It is not that all social questions happen to have political elements but rather that 
power relations structure the very contours and conditions of possibility of all social enquiry 
(Butler 1992).1 We therefore begin from the premise that the task of social enquiry is to 
denaturalise, and thus to politicise, the power relations through which dominant discourses 
and forms of knowledge are produced – and this is the purpose of genealogy. 
Genealogy is a ‘particular form of critique’ that uses historicisation to ‘document how we 
became what we are and what we must become’ (Jenkins 2011a, 164). It is most closely 
associated with the work of Michel Foucault, who defined genealogy as the ‘antisciences’ – 
not because it rejects knowledge or defends ignorance, but rather because it openly resists 
claims to scientific legitimacy, including through positivistic gestures towards empiricism 
(Foucault 2003, 9).2 Although Foucault himself approached genealogy as a methodology that 
is ‘grey, meticulous, and patiently documentary’ (Foucault 1978, 76-7), it has been deployed 
in a multiplicity of ways in a wide variety of different contexts, including in the study of 
sovereignty (Bartelson 1995), the welfare state (Fraser and Gordon 1994), transitional justice 
(Teitel 2003), terrorism (Puar 2008), and body politics (Phipps 2014). Genealogy is not, 
therefore, tied to a specific method or set of techniques, for this in itself would be 
antithetical to the spirit of genealogical enquiry. Rather, it is perhaps best understood as 
characterising those modes of investigation that pursue the ‘intrinsic critique of the present’ 
(Crowley 2009, 341) through historicisation.  
In practicing historicisation, genealogy resists rather than pursues any kind of a 
comprehensive historical project in which history is treated, either explicitly or implicitly, as 
a ‘linear narrative that reveals our progressive drive towards enlightenment’ (Fadyl and 
Nicholls 2013, 24). Instead, it offers a way of ‘using history as a means of critical engagement 
with the present’ in order to illuminate ‘the contingency of the present and the openness of 
the future’ (Garland 2014, 367, 372). Genealogy does not always/only involve historical 
enquiry, however, as it can also entail the ‘historicisation of the contemporary moment’ 
(Puar 2007, xix) through the interrogation of present-day discourses. Such an approach is 
particularly valuable given that, as Laura Jenkins notes, ‘genealogy does more than simply 
exposing and helping us to recognise when things are contingent’ but rather aims to 
politicise the here and now. This means attending to how historical forces have produced 
the present but, if we are to ‘make sense of ourselves in new ways,’ then it also means 
evaluating the present (Jenkins 2011b, 166). Accordingly, although genealogy often entails 
the study of what Foucault termed ‘local, discontinuous, disqualified, or nonlegitimised 
knowledges’ (Foucault 2003, 9), it can also productively be put to the task of studying 
dominant discourses in order to politicise and destabilise them (Fadyl and Nicholls 2013, 24). 
Genealogy represents, above all, a ‘critical strategy that can be used to loosen, confront or 
disrupt depoliticizing perspectives’ (Jenkins 2011b, 164); it is, then, a politicising intellectual 
agenda.  
In this article, we employ genealogy as a means to make connections between the present 
and the past by situating contemporary discursive ‘moments’ of household waste within the 
context of past historical legacies. Our aim is not to provide a comprehensive historical 
overview of particular issues or events but rather to render visible how – as much as 
dominant discourses can appear as natural facts and so beyond contestation – they are 
themselves forged out of history. By discourses, we mean ‘systems of meaning-production … 
that “fix” meaning, however temporarily, and enable us to make sense of the world’ 
(Shepherd 2006, 20). Thus, we view discourses as constitutive of – rather than as neutral 
descriptors of – ‘reality’ and so as deeply implicated in the power relations that structure 
what is, and is not, politically possible to think, say and do.  
 
Historicising ‘household waste’ 
Although ‘waste’ is now often associated with the physical detritus of industrial societies – 
the term is actually much older and much more varied than this. In its older variants, waste 
is a more complex notion, relating to wider discourses of spatiality, inclusion/exclusion, the 
drawing of boundaries and the setting apart. This evolving meaning of ‘waste’ is one that is 
entangled with the governance and control of populations through moral and indeed 
material means, particularly through successive tax and benefit regimes, which has formed 
an integral part of a continuous process of state-making (Cameron 2008).3  Two historical 
moments – William Petty’s The Down Survey of Ireland (1662) and Benjamin Seebohm 
Rowntree’s Poverty, A Study of Town Life (1901) – exemplify how constructions of 
household waste have been bound up with the constitution of sovereignty for centuries.  
In his justification for The Down Survey of Ireland in the late 1650s,4 Sir William Petty (1662) 
described its purpose as follows: 
Ireland is a place which must have so great an Army kept up in it, as may 
make the Irish desist from doing themselves or the English harm by their 
future Rebellions. And this great Army must occasion great and heavy 
Leavies upon a poor people and wasted Countrey; it is therefore not 
amiss that Ireland should understand the nature and measure of Taxes 
and Contributions. 
 
The ‘wasting’ in question had resulted not from the brutal colonial war waged by the English, 
but, in Petty’s eyes, from the inefficient management of the land and people of Ireland.  
Petty’s vision for the Irish was an ordered, rational and planned form of governance (by the 
English – hence the prominence of the army), all based on what he called ‘political 
arithmetick’: statistics. The land was ‘wasted’ not because it was in any sense surplus or 
destroyed, but simply because it was empty and or underused. Petty wanted to replace the 
rather haphazard system of Irish ‘parishes’ with a new form based on standard population 
units. Each parish would consist of a specific number of households, neatly combining 
spiritual, economic and social discipline. Thus controlled, parishes would be managed for 
maximum agricultural production (Petty was himself a significant landowner in the 
conquered territories), freeing surplus labour to be used to build infrastructure both in 
Ireland and back in England.  Although fortunately never fully realised, Petty’s totalitarian 
vision for Ireland was nonetheless very important as a precursor to later ‘rationalist’ state-
building enterprises.  Unlike later political economists, at this stage in the active 
development of state theory the household was still a foundational unit. Bodin’s vision of 
state sovereignty had, almost a century earlier (1601), begun with the household. Hobbes’ 
later vision (both in De Cive (1647) and Leviathan (1651)) was more atomistic and 
individualised, but retained the household in the form of the ‘natural family’ as the 
foundation of all dominion. As Petty stood firmly within this mercantilist tradition (he had 
acted as Hobbes’ personal secretary), it is hardly surprising that the household also formed 
the basis of his own conception of the orderly state. Importantly for our purposes, Petty’s 
vision also stood at an important turning point in the use of the concept of waste.   
In Petty’s terms waste referred in part to the oldest use of the term; as a descriptor of open 
and/or unused territory. Sharing etymological roots with ‘vast’, this ancient concept of waste 
was a descriptor of all that lay ‘beyond’ – the wilderness beyond the city walls. In this 
original form the concept does not carry any notion of degradation or pollution. On the 
contrary it was often used to describe land in its pristine form but full of potential – not yet 
territory, not yet exploited, not yet owned. Petty also, however, looked forward to a world 
where such wastes – at least on land – no longer lay beyond the pale, because the whole of 
the land-surface of the earth was – at least in theory – occupied.  More than that, the notion 
of a waste people, already gaining currency at the time Petty was writing,5 was closely linked 
to the territorial definitions. The nascent state, using techniques pioneered by Petty’s 
‘political arithmetick’, more and more completely occupied the land, so that the concepts of 
waste and wastefulness moved from the land to those occupying it (Poovey 1998). More 
than a passive exercise in mapping the physical terrain, Petty’s visionary mission was to draw 
territory and people together into a carefully planned colonial domain in which the full 
potential of land and people would be harnessed to goals of spiritual purity and economic 
efficiency. From the outset, as the quote from Petty above makes all too clear, such goals 
were functions of state finance. For Petty, taxation – not yet an established ‘national’ 
practice – was the key to taming land and people, because they were to pay for their own 
military subjugation (cf. also Bourdieu 1998).  As we will see in greater detail below, the 
linkage of waste and wasteful people to state finance now relates more to the benefit 
system than to taxation (i.e. the burden on rather than the contribution to state finance), 
but the connection between finance and spatial repression remains extant. 
Petty was an early exponent of the idea of waste as moral laxity – excessive, unplanned, 
uncultivated: wasteful.  This use of waste emerged rapidly from then on as part of a series of 
interlinked narratives all designed to create the ‘social body’ of the state (Poovey 1995).  As 
the bureaucratic and infrastructural demands of the emergent ‘public sphere’ (Habermas) 
developed, antipathy to wastefulness was joined by notions of discipline, hygiene (Ross 
1995) female passivity and submissiveness (Easlea 1980), the separation of public and 
private domains of activity, class and racial hierarchies and so on.   
Just as Petty’s vision of the planned space economy deployed territorial enclosure as a form 
of primitive accumulation, so similar techniques were applied to particular social groups.  As 
Sylvia Federici has shown, the rise of the witch-hunts in Europe during the 15th to 17th 
centuries contributed to a specific and very violent gendering of economic activity (Federici 
2004). Federici and others have argued that the witch-hunts were both a particular 
technique for removing women from ‘waste’ land prior to enclosure, but were also 
symptomatic of a wider disciplining and restriction of female economic participation (Zemon 
Davis 1975, Easlea 1980, Davies 1999, Federici 2004).   
The notion of wastefulness in relation to ‘household spending beyond means’ emerged as 
early as Benjamin Seebohm Rowntree’s study Poverty, A Study of Town Life published in 
1901. Here he made his influential distinction between primary and secondary poverty, with 
the former defined as ‘families whose total earnings are insufficient to obtain the minimum 
necessaries for the maintenance of merely physical efficiency’ and the latter defined as 
characteristic of ‘families whose total earnings would be sufficient for the maintenance of 
merely physical efficiency were it not that some portion of it is absorbed by other 
expenditure, either useful or wasteful’ (Rowntree 1901: vii-x). Although Rowntree regarded 
structural factors as key causes of poverty, he nevertheless claimed that these were at least 
in part in the control of the individuals. They included ‘drink, betting, and gambling. Ignorant 
or careless housekeeping, and other improvident expenditure, the latter often induced by 
irregularity of income’ (Rowntree 1901: 5) – understandings of wastefulness that mark a 
close resemblance with current usages of the concept as we will turn to below.  
The moral laxity of this excessive expenditure by one end of the social spectrum of Britain, is 
connected – albeit loosely – to acknowledgement of an emerging ‘libidinal economy’ among 
wealthier classes. In the late 18th century, for example, the founder of the Methodist 
Church, John Wesley, noted a contradiction among his congregation whose pious frugality 
led to wealth, but whose wealth then led to impiety.  As he put it (1786): 
The Methodists in every place grow diligent and frugal; consequently they increase 
in goods. Hence they proportionately increase in pride, in anger, in the desire of the 
flesh, the desire of the eyes, and the pride of life. So, although the form of religion 
remains, the spirit is swiftly vanishing away. Is there no way to prevent this continual 
decay of pure religion? 
 
The tradition for non-conformist religions to invest charitably in the social and moral fabric 
of local and national communities (Quaker towns, school endowments, missionary 
foundations, etc.) arose precisely from this need to counter the ‘wastefulness’ inherent to 
an emerging ‘libidinal economy’.  In Wesley’s and others’ terms this was still excess 
spending, but it was much less morally clear-cut because it lacked the additional ‘flaw’ of 
expenditure over means that featured in Rowntree’s later account. Nevertheless, these 
and similar narratives about the ‘proper’ use of wealth found their way not only into the 
foundational legislation of what would later become the British ‘welfare state’ (e.g. the 
Poor Laws of the 1830s onwards), but also into more recent debates around charitable 
giving and corporate social responsibility, and on up to and including the terms in which 
the causes of the 2008 banking crisis were described (Cameron et al. 2011). 
We do not have space here to fully rehearse the ways in which the meanings of waste have 
proliferated and evolved. But it is important to note the inflections that the concept adds 
to emergent aspects of ‘economy’ that rapidly become embedded within the emergent 
structures of the state and which continue to inform the ways in which contemporary 
political economies mobilise ‘waste’. Our two tales of waste are intended to illuminate 
how, historically, waste carries a range of meanings – a description of wilderness (the 
wastes), a pejorative notion of excess (wasted money, time, etc.) and a definition of both 
environmental and social pollution (waste products, waste people). They also highlight how 
the process of enacting a political economy (inscribed in territory, population, law, etc.) 
necessarily involves mobilising a series of overlapping definitions of waste/not-waste and 
allocating these normative constructions in different ways to different social groups – 
‘those forces that strip people of their human dignity and reproduce them as dehumanized 
waste, the disposable dregs and refuse of social life’ (Tyler 2013, 140). Finally, these two 
tales exemplify how constructions of household waste in particular were involved in the 
constitution of the British nation state. National sovereignty, though it constitutes diverse 
groups of people as a single population contained within a defined state territory, also 
makes a series of more or less explicit assumptions about the division of that population 
into households. This is, of course, partly an attempt to describe how ‘most’ people live – 
as part of some form of family household in one place. But mobilising a concept of a 
‘normal’ and/or ’average’ household entails making choices about what does and does not 
count as a household, what its responsibilities are expected and/or required to be, how it is 
legally defined and disciplined and so on.  
 
The wasteful politics of austerity   
We now turn to dominant contemporary discourses in order to explore how conceptions of 
household waste continue to play out in the present. As noted earlier, appeals to 
household waste are being made in a variety of contexts, but we focus on their articulation 
in formal political speeches by the British Prime Minister (at the time of writing),6 David 
Cameron. Although formal speeches are clearly not the only/primary site of political 
discourse, it is nevertheless performatively significant that the Prime Minister (who, after 
all, is symbolically positioned as the very embodiment of political authority in the United 
Kingdom) is deploying the language and logic of household waste. This does not mean, 
however, that we conceive of discourses in terms of individualistic intentionalism, for 
‘discourses, as the actors themselves and the institutions that they represent, [are] both 
constituted by and constitutive of a wider discursive terrain’ (Shepherd 2008, 296-7). Our 
aim is rather to point to particular discursive moments in which various appeals to 
household waste are being ‘fixed’ in current political discourse. That they are being 
articulated in multiple contexts – including in speeches by Cameron on themes as diverse 
as the ‘August riots,’ ‘troubled families,’ welfare provision, and the government’s long-term 
economic plan – suggests that  they are internal rather than incidental to neoliberal 
austerity politics.  
The claim that austerity politics draw on narratives surrounding ‘waste’ may seem a rather 
intuitive one. After all, central to the austerity agenda of the Conservative governments 
under David Cameron has been the notion that economic crisis has represented a crisis not 
of the UK’s model of economic growth but rather a crisis of debt (Hay and Smith 2013), with 
austerity representing an attempt to rein in such debt. That public debt is a direct 
consequence of ‘wasteful’ government spending has of course long been a defining feature 
of Conservative Party ideology, and so too has it been a consistent theme for the current 
government – indeed, the 2015 manifesto alone contained six references to ‘waste’ - for e.g. 
‘wasteful spending’ or ‘wasteful projects’ (Conservative Party 2015). However, what has 
received scarce attention in the literature on economic and social crisis is how the austerity 
imperative is being articulated as much through the language of private debt as public debt, 
and how this in turn depends upon a series of metaphors surrounding ‘responsible’ versus 
‘irresponsible’ households (Jensen 2012). This is a surprising omission, for it is striking just 
how consistently and explicitly Cameron articulates government waste in and though the 
language of the household, although he does so in a variety of different ways. Indeed, as we 
shall discuss, it is through a complex lexicon of waste and wastefulness that Cameron sets 
out both his vision for Britain’s economic and social recovery and, conversely, his 
assessment of the causes of Britain’s economic and social decline.  
As Cameron stated in his speech, ‘The Values that Underpin Our Long-term Economic Plan’ in 
March 2014: 
Let’s be clear: there is no such thing as government money. It’s your money – 
taxpayer’s money.  It’s not my money, not George Osborne’s money, not the 
government’s money - it’s your money.  Hard-working people’s money … [E]very bit of 
government waste we can cut, every efficiency we can achieve, is money we can give 
back to you. (Cameron 2014) 
 Here the ‘needs’ of the household are appealed to in justifying cuts in government waste or, 
put another way, government ‘waste’ is constructed as a drain on the family – it is the 
responsibility of government to scale back in order to protect households:  
Some people talk as if the sums of money the government spends are so big that it 
almost doesn’t matter about the odd pound or two here or there. That’s totally 
irresponsible. You wouldn’t take that approach to managing your money. And 
neither should we in government. That’s important at the best of times but it’s more 
important than ever when families are feeling the squeeze. Because every bit of 
government waste we can cut, every efficiency we can achieve, is money we can give 
back to you (Cameron 2014) 
 
Similarly, Cameron (2015) argued at the Conservative Party Conference: 
Who gets hurt when governments lose control of spending and interest rates go 
through the roof? Who gets hurt when you waste money on debt interest and have 
to cut the NHS…No – not the rich…it’s poor people, working people. 
 
Yet, just as government waste is articulated as impacting upon household waste, so too is the 
household constructed as responsible for Britain’s economic and social prospects. Simply 
put, if ‘Britain’ is in trouble through (public) debt, then it is the job of the (private) household 
to cut back, while still retaining the necessary level of (credit-fuelled) spending to enable 
growth. As Cameron claimed in ‘The Values that Underpin Our Long-Term Economic Plan’: 
If we don’t get to grips with the deficit now we are passing a greater and greater 
burden of debt to our children. We are saying that more and more of their hard 
earned future income should be wasted on paying off the bill we leave them. Do we 
really want to be the ones who responded to a crisis by putting off to tomorrow 
what we had to do today? … We all want the same for our children: a secure future 
and a chance to make something of their lives. But they won’t get that future unless 
we cut the deficit now’ (Cameron 2014).7 
 
Indeed, at times Cameron reverses this logic so that, rather than blaming families for 
overspending, families and their saving habits are used as moral examples for the state: 
 
We can't just be thinking about today, we should be thinking about the rainy days 
that could come – just like a family does. They put something aside, take out the 
insurance plan, pay off some of the mortgage when they have something spare. 
That’s what we should do as a country – making sure we are ready to cope with 
future crises (Cameron 2015). 
 
And, on occasion, Britain itself is likened to a household at risk of bankruptcy – as Cameron 
argued in a ‘Speech on the Big Society’ on 23 May 2011, for instance:  
Everyone knows that sorting out our nation’s finances, and dealing with the terrible 
economic mess that we inherited, is this government’s most urgent priority … 
Because spending cuts are not the ends; they’re not even the means to the ends … 
they’re just a symptom of the inescapable reality that you cannot get anything done 
if your country goes bankrupt … No country is owed a living in the modern, global 
economy. It’s got to earn it – and earn it the hard way (Cameron 2011). 
 
Or, addressing the Scottish conservative conference in 2015: 
 
[W]e have fought the risk of break-up, now we have to fight to stave off the risk of 
bankruptcy (Cameron 2015a). 
 
Although these multiple and, at times, competing discourses might at first appear to suggest 
contradiction and confusion, what they all in fact highlight is how the politics of austerity 
itself depends upon connections between the economic and the social through the drawing 
of parallels between the greed, consumption and profligacy of both the state and the 
household (Stanley 2014). Central here is the repositioning of economic crisis into the realm 
of social responsibility, so that economic imperatives become articulated in and through the 
language of social responsibility. For example, in his ‘Speech on the Big Society’, Cameron’s 
social vision is explicitly situated within the context of the economic challenges facing Britain. 
Having outlined the pressing need to ‘rebalance and revitalise our economy’, he sets out his 
vision for a ‘bigger, stronger society’ in which the social is defined in strikingly individualistic 
terms – ‘taking responsibility for your family’ and ‘taking responsibility for your community’ 
(Cameron 2011). This vision, although the terminology has slightly changed, is the same in 
Cameron’s speech to the Conservative Party conference in 2015, where the roots causes of 
poverty – ‘children growing in chaos; addiction, mental health problems, abuse, family 
breakdown’ – are firmly placed in the realm of individual responsibility: ‘Because we know in 
this party that the best way out of poverty is work. That’s why we reformed welfare, 
introduced the cap and helped to create 2.5 million jobs’ (Cameron 2015). This move – in 
which collective action problems are placed squarely on the shoulders of individuals – in turn 
directly enables poverty and inequality to be attributed to individual failure rather than to 
government policy or socio-economic structures (Tepe-Belfrage 2014). For, as Cameron also 
states: 
We must build a bigger, stronger society because we can’t keep tolerating the 
wasted lives and wasted potential that comes when talent is held back by 
circumstance … The problem today is that a culture of responsibility is too often 
absent in our country. And we need to restore it’ (Cameron 2011).  
 
Such narratives depict the poor as individually responsible for the structural context in 
which they find themselves – ‘Our heart tells us that we can’t just stand by while people live 
these lives and cause others so much misery. Our head tells us we can’t afford to keep 
footing the monumental bills for social failure’ (Cameron, 2011c). Or, as Ian Duncan Smith 
has stated even more explicitly: ‘Britain is witnessing a growth in an underclass whose 
lifestyles affect everyone’ (Smith 2008), therefore requiring intervention in some peoples’ 
lifestyles.  
Although the language of the ‘Big Society’ has subsequently fallen away, such constructions 
of household waste remain a core characteristic of more recent Conservative narratives that 
are mainly built on getting people into work as the ‘only’ way out of poverty (Cameron 
2015). These narratives continue the focus on individuals’ responsibility for their own 
situation and stress the need to develop individuals’ aspirations and get them out of their 
‘wasteful’ ways, rather than to focus on providing decent housing, equal access to good 
education and good health for all, and/or developing a society that provides a good life for 
all.  
And yet it is not just individuals per se but rather individual households that are constructed 
as lying at the heart of Britain’s economic and social troubles: ‘Broken Britain’ is the ‘broken 
family’ very specifically (Smith 2016). A prominent and consistent theme in Cameron’s 
discourse is precisely that both public and private waste is the direct consequence of the 
failure of individual families – ‘we must treat the causes of poverty at their source … 
whether that’s debt, family break-down, educational failure or addiction’ (Cameron 2012); 
‘a bad relationship between parents means a child is more likely to live in poverty, fail at 
school, end up in prison or be unemployed in later life’ (Cameron 2011a); and so on. It is the 
productive household and the hard-working family that represents the future for Britain, and 
the wasteful household and dysfunctional family that threatens such a future. In this sense, 
waste is articulated in ways that define poor households not only as wasteful in terms of 
their practices but as themselves constituting a form of waste, with human lives literally 
depicted as economic costs. As Cameron stated in his now infamous ‘Troubled Families’ 
speech of December 2011: 
Officialdom might call them ‘families with multiple disadvantages’.  Some in the 
press might call them ‘neighbours from hell’.  Whatever you call them, we’ve known 
for years that a relatively small number of families are the source of a large 
proportion of the problems in society.  Drug addiction. Alcohol abuse. Crime. A 
culture of disruption and irresponsibility that cascades through generations.  We’ve 
always known that these families cost an extraordinary amount of money …but now 
we’ve come up the actual figures.  Last year the state spent an estimated £9 billion 
on just 120,000 families…that is around £75,000 per family (Cameron 2011).  
 
As the title and content of the ‘Troubled Families’ speech exemplifies, the wasteful poor are 
constructed not only as wasteful individuals but specifically as wasteful families: 
This waste of human potential is not sustainable and therefore the Government has 
committed to a renewed drive to deal with troubled families (Communities and Local 
Government 2011). 
 
These narratives of poor households not only as making waste but as being wasteful thus 
serves to naturalise the structural inequality (indeed, the structural violence) of neoliberal 
capitalism. As Grace Hong writes, to depict human-beings as without morality does 
important political work, for to be constituted as a moral subject means ‘having a claim to 
exist, and for one’s existence to be protected.’ To cast people and populations as immoral 
therefore enables them to be rendered ‘surplus’ and ‘extinguishable’ (Hong 2012, 92). In 
this sense, households – or, more accurately, imaginaries of household waste – become 
implicated in the production of systematic material oppression. In his ‘Speech on the 
Fightback After the Riots’ following the so-called August riots of 2011, Cameron put it as 
follows: 
Do we have the determination to confront the slow-motion moral collapse that has 
taken place in parts of our country these past few generations?  Irresponsibility.  
Selfishness.  Behaving as if your choices have no consequences.  Children without 
fathers.  Schools without discipline.  Reward without effort.  Crime without 
punishment.  Rights without responsibilities.  Communities without control.  Some of 
the worst aspects of human nature tolerated, indulged - sometimes even 
incentivised - by a state and its agencies that in parts have become literally de-
moralised’ (Cameron 2011b). 
 
The politics of individualizing responsibility for wellbeing must be understood as sitting 
firmly within processes of an ongoing neoliberalisation of the welfare state (Peck 2002) 
where the market is presented as the best, if not only, means of securing individuals’ 
wellbeing and social assistance is understood as an obstruction to this aim. Yet, this politics 
of disciplining individuals and their lifestyles serve to legitimise a deepening and extending 
of neoliberalism (Fraser and Murphy 2013: 38) in the context of ‘severe austerity’ (Rubery 
and Rafferty 2014: 123). Here, a regime of market citizenship (Bakker and Silvey 2008) 
provides the ideological foundation of a sharp reduction of benefits levels and a further rise 
of workfare, thereby constructing recipients as undeserving (Peck 2001) and their lifestyles 
open to critique and disciplining. Appeals to ‘family values’ take on a very different hue 
when viewed in the context of the dismantling of the welfare state and the shift from public 
to private sources of support and economic relief (McGarry and Haggerty 2015; Halberstam 
2011: 72). 
Although ‘state-household’8 spending as linked to conceptualisations of ‘family-household’ 
conjures up a normative sense of equality, it is deeply morally loaded against the poor. For 
example, it is striking that loans taken out by students to pay for education are left 
untargeted by discourses surrounding waste, even though they can lead to indefinite 
indebtedness. Yet the taking-out of loans from ‘payday lenders’ to pay for absolutely crucial 
and life sustaining utilities or food at the end of the month is, by contrast, constructed as 
wasteful. More precisely, in terms Mrs Moneypenny might understand, the wasteful 
lifestyle choices that make such loans necessary mean that the lenders/spenders have been 
unable to live within their means. And so poverty becomes recast as consumption. 
Such discourses elide how state and household spending ‘beyond means’ has been a crucial 
feature of deficit and/or credit-fuelled growth over the last decades.9 Although both 
national and household debts are routinely cited as problems, ‘[n]eoliberal states have 
produced legal and institutional environments where even many moderate-income 
households cannot afford to live without voluntarily submitting to usurious debt contracts’ 
(Kear, 2015: 1). The role of political decision-making – in determining what level of ‘state 
household’ debt is considered appropriate and, similarly, what kind of expenditures are 
considered necessary – is thus obscured through the individualising and responsibilising 
language of wasteful consumption. Moreover, as Susanne Soederberg has argued, the 
emergence of ‘debtfare states’ has entailed a normalisation of ‘the reliance on credit to 
augment and/or replace the living wage or the government benefit cheque’ (Soederberg 
2014: 3), and this has enabled the very growth model that neoliberalism is so reliant upon 
(Hay 2013).  
It is a cruel irony that households – especially the most populous ones – must spend beyond 
their means in order to ensure growth even as they are blamed for their wastefulness. And 
yet the governing and controlling of complex and contradictory forms of wastefulness and 
necessary spending is itself required by the neoliberal British state. While the narrative of 
the wasteful middle and lower class household serves as a strong moment to legitimise 
welfare cuts and disciplinary politics, this must of course be balanced against the need for 
all households to spend up to and beyond their means to enable growth, with even the 
Office for Budget Responsibility (2015) predicating the UK’s future growth on rising 
household debt levels. An expansive and scarcely regulated industry that enables credit to 
be available, even to those living ‘beyond their means’ (and because such ‘sub-prime’ loans 
are so staggeringly expensive, pushing them inevitably further beyond their means) further 
exemplifies this: ‘Traditional pawnshops and loan sharks now compete with a variety of 
products designed to serve the under-banked’ (Soederberg 2014: 1).10 Poor households are 
constructed as a ‘drain’ on the ‘the system’ that ‘we’ all have to ‘hold up’ and yet poverty is 
the system, for poverty is hugely profitable for capitalism. The ‘poverty industry’ targets the 
poor, unemployed and underemployed by including them in the financial sphere through 
credit whilst these populations are simultaneously targeted through morality discourses as 
wasteful and immoral (Soederberg 2014). As Martijn Konings writes:   
The culture of self-help that is so crucial to neoliberal governmentality involves a 
dialectic of continuous affirmation and rejection, seduction and denial … Neoliberal 
governmentality involves the creation of chains of disciplinary pressures, networks 
composed of acts of everyday sadism and expressions of judgment that serve to 
distract us from the resentment provoked by our submission to authority structures 
we do not fully understand and experience as oppressive and constraining. This re-
directing of our anger and discontent serves to … contort our notions of self-
realization and responsible living in such a way that we end up ascribing a spiritual 
dimension to balancing the household budget (Konings 2009, 120-21). 
 
Discourses of household waste, then, should be understood as anything but trivial, even if 
their absence in the literature on crisis and austerity suggests that they are regarded as a 
‘merely cultural’ matter (Butler 1997, 265). Rather, they are deeply implicated in 
contemporary political imaginaries that find expression not only in everyday sites and in 
popular media but also in ‘formal’ political discourse from policy-makers themselves. Indeed, 
as we have sought to show through our genealogy of household waste, these longstanding, 
historic discourses define the very discursive architecture upon which austerity politics are 
being articulated and made thinkable, even as they are in turn being reconfigured in and 
through neoliberal austerity. As we have also argued, these narratives render the poor both 
individually culpable for their own poverty and collectively culpable for Britain’s economic 
and social crisis. If we are to challenge the mechanisms through which the structural sources 
of capitalist oppression are naturalised and normalised over time, it is vital for scholars to 
expose and contest the discursive practices that construct people and populations as 
wasteful in this way. But, as our intervention has above all highlighted, this in turn requires 
doing justice to the household as an integral part of this story, for it is households (and 
especially poor ones) that are constructed not only as producing waste but as constituting 
waste in and of themselves. Critical scholarship therefore needs to do much more to bring 
in, and perhaps even begin with, the household in order to interrogate, critique and resist 
the production of ‘wasted lives’ in this way (Bauman 2013).  
 
Conclusions 
We want to end, as we began, with Superscrimpers in order to tell one final tale of 
household waste. Around the time that Superscrimpers appeared on British screens, the 
production company behind it, Endemol, was having to confront its own ‘wasteful ways’. 
Already a major global media company, by 2011 Endemol was reported to be in debt to the 
tune of $4.1 billion (Kuo 2011). Major investors such as Goldman Sachs and Mediaset (a 
company owned by the Berlusconi ‘household’) were ‘facing losses of more than 60 percent’ 
as the company’s complex financial structure unwound with the plummeting value of the 
Euro (Bloomberg 2011). Facing a financial meltdown, Endemol was rescued through a debt-
equity swap led by private equity firm Apollo Global Management. With roots in the junk 
bond businesses pioneered by disgraced financier Michael Milken in the 1980s, Apollo 
specialises in ‘distressed expertise’ – i.e. identifying over-leveraged companies on the verge 
of collapse and applying their particular knowledge of the inner working of share and bond 
markets to turn them into profitable and/or saleable assets. Apollo is also linked to several 
intertwined ‘households’; several members of its board being married to each others’ 
siblings or other relatives. Most recently, Apollo entered into a joint venture with another 
global media household headed by Rupert Murdoch, Chairman and CEO of 21st Century Fox. 
Together, Apollo and 21st Century Fox have formed the Endemol Shine Group. In doing so, 
the debts run up through Endemol’s excessive spending have been converted into share 
equity for its new parent companies.  
We tell this final story, rather obviously, to further underscore how households are 
presented as equal, but that some are (with apologies to Orwell) considerably more equal 
than others. Those ‘extraordinary’ households that are able to magically convert debt into 
equity constitute a bizarre norm of ‘non-excessive’ consumption against which the ‘ordinary 
household’ is found wanting.   
Just as John Wesley’s Methodists sought to avoid the perils of libidinal economy through 
charity, so the more ‘extraordinary’ end of the contemporary ‘household’ disburses its 
wealth through good works. The owners of Endemol-Shine, Mrs Moneypenny’s new 
paymasters, all have impressive lists of charitable, cultural and environmental projects on 
their corporate social responsibility web-pages. Many of these are oriented, in one way or 
another towards the family and the promotion of family values. Whilst all this is no doubt of 
considerable value and importance to those who benefit from such largesse, it also in a 
sense brings the contemporary debate about ‘household waste’ full circle: the excess wealth 
of the corporate household is offering itself as supporting those ‘households’ falling through 
the gaps of a privatised, austerity-oriented welfare system.   
The problem with this, of course, is that whilst private philanthropy can do great things, not 
only can it not replace a welfare state, it serves to further constrain it. In the peculiar 
discourse of waste and wastefulness that has accompanied austerity – markedly in Britain, 
but elsewhere too – the household is presented both as an ideal-typical social and economic 
unit, but also a problem to be solved. Notwithstanding that the corporate households that 
bring Superscrimpers and the rest to our screens are thoroughly abnormal, by implication 
they constitute a vague norm of the proper household – the one that lives within its means – 
against which the rest are found wanting. David Cameron’s and others’ confusing and 
shifting positions on the nature and meaning of the household centre on its particular 
relationship to the concept of ‘waste’ – a moral agenda smuggled in as ‘normal’ domestic 
economics.  
In this article, we have offered a genealogy of household waste in order to show how – well 
before the likes of Superscrimpers emerged – the household has long been connected to 
waste. Households have variously been constructed as the source of or solution to waste, 
and – as is the case with current austerity debates – they are also being categorised as waste 
themselves. In the UK, these specific narratives are being deployed as part of a broader 
neoliberal project to reoccupy the ‘wastes’ of the world as a means of escaping not just the 
state, but those flawed consumers and, especially, households that seem to make the 
greatest, wasteful, demands upon it. Multiple meanings of household waste are therefore 
being used – as they have been used historically – to re-differentiate state spaces (both 
normative and real) in ways that close down some forms of households in favour of others. 
As we have argued, this operates as a form of ‘everyday sadism’ (Konings 2009, 120) through 
which the ‘structural deleterious effects of neoliberal practices, principles and cultures’ 
(Winnubst 2012, 80) are not only lived by the poor, but are blamed on them too. Thus, even 
as austerity politics are constituted through appeals to the household, so too the 
consequences of austerity impact devastatingly upon actual households – the material 
depletion of households made possible through imaginaries of household waste. 
 
Notes
                                                          
1
 As Judith Butler writes, to recognise social theory as always-already imbued with power does not represent a 
turn to apolitical nihilism but, quite the contrary, is ‘the very precondition of a politically engaged critique’. 
Indeed, ‘the recourse to a position … that places itself beyond the play of power … is perhaps the most 
insidious ruse of power’ (Butler 1992, 6-7). 
2
 For example, although it is customary in the social sciences to justify exactly how many pieces of a type of 
‘data’ (e.g. semi-structured interview ‘data’) have been collated and analysed, such moves are directly at odds 
with the spirit of genealogical critique, and Foucault does not make them accordingly. Indeed, for Foucault it is 
precisely that certain forms of knowledge attempt to cast themselves as ‘legitimate’ knowledge – including 
through the language of technical expertise – that warrants critique, i.e. to uncover how unequal power 
relations are reproduced through practices of knowledge production (Foucault 2003). 
3
 Here refer to the state not only as a legal/territorial entity (though clearly that too) but also in terms of a 
much more diffuse notion of statehood in which boundaries are complex and multiple – normative and moral 
as much as physical and/or territorial. 
4
 An extensive digital collection of material relating to the Down Survey can be found at  
http://downsurvey.tcd.ie/ [accessed 30/10/2015]. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
5
 The Oxford English Dictionary dates this notion of waste as far back as Thomas Nashe’s Pierce Penniless, 1592 
(OED 2016). 
6
 April 2016. 
7
 Also cited in Smith (2015, 244-5). 
8
 While the English language does not make the equation automatically, in German the ‘Staatshaushalt’ clearly 
equates the form of economic management of the state with the ‘Haushalt’ of the family. German proclaimed 
‘probity’ around state spending decisions has often been legitimised through this comparision. 
9
 Indeed at the time of writing, the UK’s ‘national debt’ has risen to an estimated £1.53 trillion under 
Cameron’s government. 
10
 David Harvey’s (2001) notion of a spatio-temporal fix is instructive in describing the displacement of 
wasteful spending through available credit (Soederberg, 2014) and the role of the credit card industry in 
securing this fix sponsored by (a lack of) state regulation. 
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